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Abstract 
This paper reviews price-level targeting in the light of current theoretical knowledge and 
past practical experience. We discuss progress in the economic debate on this issue, start-
ing with the traditional arguments discussed in the early 1990s and ending with the most 
recent literature from the beginning of the new millennium. We devote special attention to 
the issues of the zero interest rate bound, time consistency, and communication. Practical 
experience from Sweden in the 1930s and Czechoslovakia in the first few years after WWI 
is used to illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of price-level targeting. Finally, 
the similarities of price-level and inflation developments with hypothetical outcomes 
under price-level targeting are investigated in selected inflation-targeting countries. 
1. Introduction 
Academic discussions on price-level targeting have revived recently as some 
central banks have reached the zero interest rate bound. In the need to go beyond 
the  limits of standard monetary policy instruments, central banks have turned to 
unconventional monetary policy tools, including the purchase of government bonds 
and private securities, and foreign exchange interventions. Besides these unconven-
tional measures, the theory suggests another solution to the zero interest rate bound–
the adoption of price-level targeting.  
Under inflation targeting, after a shock hits an economy the central bank acts 
to bring inflation back to its target rate and abstracts away from the permanent effects 
of the shock on the price level. In contrast, under price-level targeting a central bank 
acts to return the price level to its original (targeted) path. This difference, although it 
might look small, has large implications for the formation of price expectations and 
the conduct, credibility, and communication of monetary policy, including the proba-
bility of hitting the zero interest rate bound.  
Despite a substantial body of research on price-level targeting, central banks 
have very limited practical experience with this strategy. The Riksbank is considered 
to be the only central bank to have applied price-level targeting (in the 1930s). How-
ever, the experience of Czechoslovakia in the first few years after WWI also resem-
bles price-level targeting. 
In this paper, we review both the existing academic research and the practical 
experience with price-level targeting. We extend existing survey papers (e.g. Ambler, 
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2009, and Bauducco and Caputo, 2010) in at least three aspects. First, we update 
the literature survey to include the most recent contributions. Second, we put this 
theoretical literature into contrast with practical experience. In addition to the widely 
known experience of Sweden we describe deflationary policy in Czechoslovakia as 
another example of price-level targeting. Third, we investigate how inflation target-
ing differs from price-level targeting in the  light of actual price developments in 
inflation-targeting countries.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theo-
retical debate on price-level targeting. In this section, we first review the traditional 
arguments for and against price-level targeting. We then summarize Svensson’s semi-
nal 1999 paper, which initiated renewed interest in this strain of research. In Section 2 
we also discuss price-level targeting from the  perspective of deflation risk and 
the existence of a zero bound on nominal interest rates, the communication of price- 
level targeting, and time-inconsistency problems. Section 3 provides a  historical 
excursion to inter-war Sweden and Czechoslovakia, whose monetary policy regimes 
resembled price-level targeting. Price-level developments in inflation-targeting coun-
tries are also discussed in this section. Section 4 concludes with a summary. 
2. The Debate 
2.1 Traditional Argumentation 
Price-level targeting was advocated by Alfred Marshall (1887), Knut Wicksell 
(1898), and Irving Fisher (1922). Practical issues, however, were missing from their 
work. The pre-WWII literature saw price-level stability as a means of stabilizing eco-
nomic activity. After WWII, discussions concerning monetary policy focused mainly 
on inflation. 
The debate on the issue of price-level targeting (constant or constantly increas-
ing) was enlivened at the beginning of 1990s. The topic was pursued by, among 
others, McCallum (1990), Lebow et al. (1992), Fillion and Tetlow (1994), Goodhart 
(1994), Duguay (1994), Fischer (1994), and Haldane and Salmon (1995). 
Most papers dating from this time period regard lower uncertainty about 
the future price level as the main benefit of price-level targeting. On the other hand, 
increased output variability (and–according to some authors–increased inflation varia-
bility) is considered the primary disadvantage of the regime. 
In the case of inflation targeting, there is considerable uncertainty about the price 
level in the distant future. The price level in this regime is a random walk, which 
implies that its variability is linearly increasing with the distance from the present 
time. This regime thus allows price-level drift. The unit root in the price level arising 
from the inflation target is mentioned in Lebow et al. (1992), Fillion and Tetlow 
(1994), Duguay (1994), and Haldane and Salmon (1995). On the contrary, a price- 
level target path implies–according to these authors–that the  price level moves 
around the target path (which can be constantly rising) without a trend. In the case of 
price-level targeting, the uncertainty about future prices is thus supposed to be limit-
ed, as the  central bank aims to eliminate all deviations from the  price-level path 
(Figure 1). 
Konieczny (1994) further notes that better predictability of the  price level 
reduces the calculation costs of future consumption, improves the role of prices in 
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Figure 1  Illustration of Price-Level and Inflation Paths under Inflation Targeting  
and under Price-Level Targeting 
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the resource allocation process, and thus minimizes the risk of errors which could 
lead to a suboptimal consumption structure. Howitt (1994) adds inappropriate alloca-
tion of capital as another possible consequence of these errors. Ragan (1994) argues 
that better predictability of the price level reduces the probability of default and thus 
cuts the costs of financial intermediation. 
Fisher (1994) primarily considers a zero inflation target, or a constant price-
level target path. He also regards lower uncertainty about the future price level as 
the main advantage of price-level targeting. He sees drawbacks in the fact that in half 
of cases (when the price level deviates upwards from the target path) the monetary 
authority aims to achieve deflation, i.e., the inflation target is negative in the short 
run. He therefore believes that price-level targeting is an inappropriate regime which 
causes short-term fluctuations in the economy and more variability in the inflation 
rate. As it provides better predictability of prices in the long run, Fisher notes the often 
cited advantage of price-level targeting in the form of higher attractiveness of long-
term contracts or savings on pensions. He argues, however, that stable real pensions 
can be more easily achieved by issuing inflation-indexed bonds. The uncertainty about 
the future price level will probably not be markedly higher if central banks target 
a small, positive rate of inflation. According to Fisher, in terms of uncertainty about 
the future price level there is no significant difference between a zero inflation target 
and a target of 2–3%. As Fisher concludes, inflation targeting with lower uncertainty 
about inflation in the short run is more convenient in spite of the higher uncertainty 
about the price level in the long run. 
Besides commenting on the  trade-off stemming from price-level targeting 
(i.e., the advantage of predictability of the price level in the long run and the disad-
vantage of increased output variability), Duguay (1994) also points out that costs 
related to the regime change need to be taken into consideration. There is a strong 
argument for prudence, seen by Duguay in uncertainty about the speed of adjustment 
of inflation expectations after switching to price-level targeting. Gaspar et al. (2007) 
run several simulations within a New Keynesian model with adaptive learning. Intro-
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periods, as agents learn about the new regime, the losses start falling and converge to 
those under commitment. 
Haldane and Salmon (1995) used stochastic simulations from a small macro-
model. In many respects the outcome of their work is parallel to the conclusions of 
Lebow et al. (1992) and Fillion and Tetlow (1994). The main disadvantage of price-
level targeting is seen by these authors in the situation of an adverse supply shock. 
As a supply shock changes the equilibrium price level, attempts to put the price level 
back to its pre-shock level will most probably lead to significant real costs. An addi-
tional cost is the increased variability of inflation in the short run, as “correcting” 
deviations from the target path increases inflation variability. 
Fillion and Tetlow (1994) argue, however, that there is a real possibility that 
price-level targeting could reduce inflation variability in comparison with inflation 
targeting. This would be so if prices are less prone to increase in the situation where 
economic agents understand that the central bank is committed to keeping the price 
level near the price target path. Black et al. (1997) came to the same conclusion using 
a stochastic model of the Canadian economy. This hypothesis was best illustrated by 
Svensson (1996), later published as Svensson (1999), which is described in detail in 
the next part. 
Kiley (1998) compares monetary policy in models with different specifica-
tions of the Phillips curve. The first specification is consistent with the neoclassical 
models of price adjustment. The second specification is based on models with sticky 
prices, implying the new-Keynesian Phillips curve. When comparing price-level target-
ing and inflation targeting, Kiley affirms a trade-off between stability of prices and 
stability of output in the  new-Keynesian model, but not in the  neoclassical one. 
Given the  empirical support for the  new-Keynesian specification, Kiley concludes 
that the stability trade-off probably exists. 
2.2 Svensson’s “Free Lunch” 
Svensson (1999) compares inflation targeting with price-level targeting in 
a model consisting of the Phillips curve and the central bank’s loss function. The tra-
ditional Phillips curve (1) assumes short-term substitution between inflation π and 
the output gap y in the presence of output gap persistence and supply shocks  t ε : 
                                         ( ) 1| 1 tt t t t t yy ρ απ π ε −− = +−+                        (1) 
Private sector inflation expectations are rational in the model, conditional on 
the information available in the given period,  |1 1 tt t t E π π −− = . 
The central bank in the inflation-targeting regime stabilizes inflation at the long-
term inflation target π* and stabilizes the output gap at a desirable level y*. The cen-
tral bank’s loss function is thus given by:  
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For the sake of simplicity the model assumes that the central bank has com-
plete control over inflation (it has efficient instruments to achieve the desired level of 
inflation). Therefore, in every period after having observed the supply shock  ti π + = 
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In the model, monetary policy is effective due to output persistence arising from 
imperfections in the labor market and sticky prices. 
When using price-level targeting the central bank faces the same Phillips 
curve as mentioned above, but the loss function is defined in terms of the deviation 
of the output gap and the price level from the desirable level:  
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Svensson shows that if output (output gap) persistence is higher than 0.5, 
a  discretionary policy of the  central bank results in lower inflation variability in 
the case of price-level targeting than in the case of inflation targeting. The reason is 
that the monetary authority targeting the price level sets inflation proportionally to 
changes in the output gap, while under inflation targeting the optimal level of infla-
tion in response to a supply shock is proportional to the size of the output gap. If 
the output gap is sufficiently persistent, the variability of its first difference is less 
than the variability of its level and inflation has lower variability in the case of price-
level targeting than in the case of inflation targeting. 
Svensson further examines a situation where the society has a preference for 
inflation stabilization (i.e., the social loss function is defined as (2)) and the central 
bank has a choice between loss functions (2) and (3). Svensson raises the question of 
whether it is preferable for the society to assign an inflation or price-level target to 
the central bank. It turns out that even with social preferences for inflation stabiliza-
tion it is optimal to define the loss function of the central bank as (3), i.e., in the form 
of price-level targeting. 
The key assumptions of Svensson’s model are an endogenous decision rule and 
the assumption of discretionary monetary policy. If the central bank was able to adopt 
a credible commitment to long-term optimal monetary policy (which in Svensson’s 
model means that inflation is on target regardless of the  size of the  output gap), 
responding only to new information captured in the model by supply shocks, then 
the variability of output and inflation in the short run would be lower under inflation 
targeting than under price-level targeting. However, Svensson questions the feasi-
bility and credibility of monetary policy under commitment even if conducted by 
an independent central bank. 
2.3 Revisiting the Assumptions 
In the same year that Svensson (1999) was published, Clarida et al. (1999) and 
Woodford (1999) reached the conclusion that in a forward-looking model, optimal 
monetary policy under commitment is characterized by stationary price levels. This 
has supported Svensson’s findings that discretionary monetary policy should be 
focused on price level stabilization. 
Clarida et al. (1999) came to this result using a different model than Svensson. 
The main difference is the use of a new-Keynesian Phillips curve, which contains 
current expectations of future inflation rather than past expectations of current infla-
tion as they appear in the neoclassical Phillips curve. 
Dittmar and Gavin (2000) also replaced the neoclassical Phillips curve used 
by Svensson with the  new-Keynesian version. Their conclusion is that the  use of Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1                                    7 
the new-Keynesian version highlights the benefits of price-level targeting because it 
is superior to inflation targeting even in the  case of small or non-existent output 
persistence. However, it still holds true that the higher is the persistence, the bigger is 
the benefit from switching to price-level targeting. 
To explain the empirically observed persistence in inflation (for example, infla-
tion persistence in the euro area has been identified by Angeloni et al., 2006), some 
models assume that a fraction of economic agents set prices in a rule-of-thumb 
manner. Steinsson (2003) shows that as the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters 
increases, it becomes less optimal to offset cost-push shocks (i.e., to target the price 
level). On the contrary, with no rule-of-thumb price-setters in the economy it is opti-
mal to offset cost-push shocks completely. Similar results were obtained by Gaspar et 
al. (2007). 
Ball et al. (2005) explain inflation persistence using the concept of costly infor-
mation. In their model, all agents can change prices in every period (in contrast to 
Calvo pricing), but only a fraction of agents possess complete information about the cur-
rent state of the economy, including the central bank’s behavior. The model leads to 
optimal monetary policy with a stationary price level as it minimizes agents’ errors 
when they set prices using incomplete information. 
The above-mentioned papers suggest that the extent to which economic agents 
are forward-looking is of key importance when judging between price-level targeting 
and inflation targeting. The more forward-looking agents are, the more persuasive are 
the arguments in favor of price-level targeting, because this regime is superior in 
anchoring price expectations. The degree of output persistence discussed in Svensson 
(1999) plays only a secondary role. 
This point is best illustrated by Vestin (2006). He uses a new-Keynesian model 
with forward-looking agents and without cost-push shock persistence to show that 
with discretionary monetary policy with a loss function defined in price (not infla-
tion) deviations and output deviations, the same level of social welfare can be achieved 
as with the optimal monetary policy under commitment by choosing an appropriate 
weight on output deviations. This is quite a strong result, since in standard models 
the social welfare that can be attained under discretion is lower than or equal to the wel-
fare under commitment. If cost-push shock persistence is added to the model, social 
welfare becomes smaller than under commitment, but is still higher than under dis-
cretion with inflation deviations in the loss function. 
If both forward-looking and backward-looking agents act in the economy, 
the highest social welfare can, under some circumstances, be attained by combining 
price-level and inflation targeting. Average-inflation targeting, where the central bank 
targets the moving average of inflation, can be considered such a combination. Nessén 
and Vestin (2005) in the new-Keynesian setup as used by Steinsson (2003) show that 
if the proportion of backward-looking agents is larger than one half, average-inflation 
targeting yields higher social welfare than price-level targeting. The bigger is the pro-
portion of backward-looking agents, the smaller is the optimal window size for average-
inflation targeting. 
Another alternative way to merge inflation targeting and price-level targeting 
is called hybrid targeting, where the central bank’s loss function is defined in both 
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either inflation targeting (with zero weight on price-level deviations) or price-level 
targeting (with zero weight on inflation deviations). Models with a hybrid loss func-
tion lead to similar results as in the  case of average-inflation targeting (see, for 
example, Barnett and Engineer, 2001; Batini and Yates, 2003; and Cecchetti and 
Kim, 2005)–if forward- and backward-looking agents coexist in an economy, hybrid 
targeting dominates both inflation targeting and price-level targeting. 
The majority of the models described above, including Svensson (1999), assume 
one good and one price only. The main disadvantage of these models is that it is im-
possible to analyze the  evolution of relative prices. Ortega and  Rebei (2006) use 
a DSGE model of the Canadian economy with two sectors (traded and non-traded). 
The model assumes nominal price rigidities on both markets and nominal wage 
rigidity. No clear advantage of price-level targeting over inflation targeting appears 
in this model. 
Berentsen and Waller (2009) built a DSGE model with three markets–two 
goods markets and one credit market. All markets are fully flexible and money is 
necessary to trade on the markets. The central bank conducts monetary policy by con-
trolling the supply of money. In this model setup, inflation targeting is ineffective 
and monetary expansion leads to higher price expectations and a higher nominal 
interest rate without any effect on the real economy, whereas price-level targeting 
efficiently anchors inflation expectations and monetary expansion has the  desired 
impact on the real economy. 
Gerberding et al. (2010) use a new-Keynesian model with two sectors. One 
sector is for intermediate goods with prices broadly corresponding to the producer 
price index (PPI). The other sector is for trading final goods with prices correspond-
ing to the consumer price index (CPI). Both sectors have rigid prices and are subject 
to different productivity shocks. The  authors come to the  conclusion that optimal 
monetary policy should allow non-stationary prices in both sectors. Price-level target-
ing implies a higher welfare loss than inflation targeting and the difference is increas-
ing in the length of the monetary policy horizon up to a horizon of approximately  
10 years. 
De Resende et al. (2010) built a multi-sector New-Keynesian DSGE model with 
several levels of production. The model economy consists of two final goods sectors, 
one of them traded and the other non-traded, two intermediate sectors, a sector pro-
ducing basic domestic inputs for other sectors, and an import sector. Both nominal 
and real rigidities exist in the economy. In this more realistic model setup, inflation 
targeting and price-level targeting are virtually equivalent from a welfare perspective. 
Another unrealistic assumption of Svensson (1999) and the majority of sub-
sequent models is that all agents in the economy, or at least their forward-looking 
part, are rational and have a full information set and full confidence in the monetary 
authority. In the case of the transition from inflation targeting to price-level targeting, 
however, the learning process and credibility build-up can take several years. Gaspar 
et al. (2007) use a model with a constant-gain learning process to analyze the transi-
tion from inflation targeting to price-level targeting. They conclude that adaptive 
learning reduces the benefits of the switch, but the benefits remain positive unless 
learning is implausibly slow (the speed of learning coefficient is less than 0.02). 
Kryvtsov et al. (2008) use a simple new-Keynesian model with gradual adjust-
ment in expectations to a new monetary policy regime of price-level targeting. With Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1                                    9 
this model they reach similar conclusions as Gaspar et al. (2007). The  transition 
yields higher welfare, but the gain is relatively small, of the order of hundredths of 
a percent.
1 Cateau et al. (2009) estimate approximately five times higher gains from 
the transition to an imperfectly credible new regime. The results are obtained from 
a DSGE model of the Canadian economy. Only if imperfect credibility prevails for 
13 years or longer do the costs of introducing a new regime exceed its benefits. 
Preston (2008) built a  model with central bank uncertainty about the  true 
behavior of economic agents. Households use adaptive learning to form their expec-
tations, but the central bank might have a misspecified model and might wrongly 
assume rational expectations. In this situation, an inflation-targeting regime is likely 
to lead to instability in the economy. However, if the same wrong assumption is made 
in a price-level targeting regime, the economy remains stable for many empirically 
reasonable parameter values. 
2.4 Risk of Deflation and the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates 
Price-level targeting is often discussed in association with the problem of reach-
ing the lower (zero) bound on interest rates, a situation with which Japan has been 
confronted since the mid-1990s but which has also concerned the United States and 
many other countries during the recent financial and economic crisis. When the mone-
tary policy rate is at or near the zero bound, the central bank’s influence on inflation 
expectations and thus on real interest rates becomes an important stabilization tool. 
With a credible regime of price-level targeting, after the price level drops below the tar-
get path, short-term inflation expectations will increase above average inflation in 
the long run and real interest rates will decrease. 
Duguay (1994) argues that the benefit of credible price-level targeting is its 
stabilizing effects on aggregate demand by raising real interest rates (through an ex-
pected price/inflation decrease) when the price level moves above the target, and by 
lowering them (via an expected price/inflation increase) when the price level falls 
below the target. Coulombe (1998) points out that credible price-level targeting can 
help limit the zero-bound problem, as it reduces the need to change nominal interest 
rates. This idea is also advocated by Berg and Jonung (1998), who believe that one 
important lesson to be drawn from the Swedish experience of the 1930s (see part 3.1.) 
is that the price-level target can be used to increase inflation expectations in a situa-
tion of serious concerns of deflation. Svensson (2001) suggests–as a possible way out 
of the liquidity trap–that Japan should temporarily introduce price-level targeting and 
at the same time the Japanese yen should be devalued and fixed. The view that price-
level targeting can help avoid the  zero-bound problem and lead an  economy out   
of the deflation trap is also held by Eggertson and Woodford (2003) and Wolman 
(2005). 
However, there are also studies emphasizing the higher probability of reach-
ing zero interest rates and the possible risk of deflation in the case of price-level tar-
geting in comparison to conventional cases. This concerns the situation where a marked 
overshooting of the target would require pushing the price level back to the target 
path, implying a need for a longer period of deflation, which could induce financial 
1 Kryvtsov et al. (2008) mention major problems with quantitatively assessing the benefits of price-level 
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instability. For example, Friedman and Gertler (2003) dispute the  conclusions of 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), whose model does not include any of the mech-
anisms that make deflation harmful (e.g. debt defaults) and assumes perfect credi-
bility of the central bank. Fear of deflation has been stressed in several studies (e.g. 
Mishkin, 2001). On the other hand, Ragan (2006) argues that sustained deflation, 
which would pose a threat to the financial system, is not probable in credible price-
level targeting. 
Nevertheless, the argument that price-level targeting can help avoid the zero 
bound problem and get the economy out of the deflation trap has gained more sup-
port recently. Mishkin (2006) mentions that arguments in favor of price-level target-
ing are very strong in cases of a deflationary environment mainly because of two 
facts: besides the effect of the expectations channel as described previously, price-
level targeting has a positive impact on banks’ and non-financial corporations’ bal-
ance sheets which–after a prolonged period of deflation–are showing severe problems 
and increased non-performing loans that prevent the financial system from working 
properly and impair the efficient allocation of capital. 
Amano and Ambler (2008) compare inflation targeting and price-level target-
ing in a situation of low trend inflation using a small calibrated DSGE model. They 
conclude that price-level targeting is more effective in keeping the economy away 
from the zero bound on nominal interest rates; and if the economy gets to the zero 
bound, it remains there for a shorter period of time. They also found that when the price 
level is targeted, the optimal rate of inflation is lower than under inflation targeting, 
thus yielding a higher level of economic welfare. 
Coibion et al. (2010) compare the regimes in the new-Keynesian model and 
they conclude that the zero bound on nominal interest rates is less likely to be hit in 
the case of price-level targeting.  
2.5 Communicating Price-Level Targeting and the Time-Inconsistency Problem 
In contrast to inflation targeting, where communication is quite straight-
forward and focused on the inflation target, communicating price-level targeting is 
much more difficult (see, e.g., Kahn, 2009). If a  central bank targets an  upward-
sloping path for the price level, it is not possible to present the target using a single 
number. Any communication of the  initial value and targeted rate of increase of 
the price level would be difficult for the public to understand and remember. Also, 
for some economic agents and their decision-making, the rate of inflation might be of 
more importance than the price level, especially if they have long experience with 
an inflation-targeting regime. 
Alternatively, it is possible to implement price-level targeting but to continue 
communicating inflation and leave an inflation target in place. However, the inflation 
target would have to be adjusted frequently depending on shocks hitting the economy 
(see, e.g., Ambler, 2009). Alternatively, an average inflation target over a longer time 
period could be communicated, ideally together with monetary policy being conduct-
ed in the average-inflation targeting manner (see the discussion of average-inflation 
targeting in Section 2.3.). Ambler argues that central banks that have explicit in-
flation targets are already implicitly using average-inflation targeting with a  time 
window of one year, since they target the year-over-year rate of inflation. Moving Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1                                    11 
from a one-year average to an average defined using a longer time window would not 
entail a radical change in communication (e.g. the Reserve Bank of Australia com-
municates its target as average inflation over the business cycle, while the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand targets average inflation over the medium term). But even 
then, communication would be more difficult compared to inflation targeting, for ex-
ample when describing the forecast (should the central bank’s reaction function be 
defined in terms of an inflation or price-level target?) or when assessing target fulfill-
ment (which deviation is more relevant – deviation from the price-level target or 
deviation from the inflation target?). 
At the same time, price-level targeting might make people think that the cen-
tral bank puts too much emphasis on past economic developments and too little 
emphasis on future developments as captured in the forecast. The more backward-
looking nature of the price-level targeting framework as compared to inflation tar-
geting is discussed in more detail in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2002). 
For all these reasons, price-level targeting poses a big communication challenge. 
Successful communication is the key prerequisite for achieving the major benefit of 
price-level targeting, namely, anchored price expectations. The importance of com-
munication in price-level targeting is strengthened by the  existence of the  time-
inconsistency problem,
2 which can put regime credibility to the test. 
The time-inconsistency problem in the context of price-level targeting can be 
described in the following way. In the event of a positive cost-push shock, a central 
bank promises future inflation below its long-run average. This has a positive effect 
on inflation expectations and lowers the costs of absorbing the shock. However, as 
soon as the shock dissipates and inflation (not the price level) is back at its long-run 
level, it would be optimal for the central bank, and also for the economy as a whole, 
to renege on its announced policies, i.e., not to offset positive shocks to the price 
level by pushing inflation below its long-run average, as this would harm output. 
Then, the price level would not return to its targeted trajectory. However, it needs to 
be stressed here that in the short run the suboptimal policy of offsetting the shock is 
necessary to maintain the credibility of the price-level targeting regime in the long 
run. Masson and Shukayev (2011) show that if the public believes in the possibility 
of the central bank resetting the price-level target, switching to price-level targeting 
can have detrimental consequences for macroeconomic volatility. 
All the models described in the previous parts of the paper assume time-
consistent conduct of price-level targeting. However, in real life it might happen that 
both the  public and professionals regard the  short-run benefits of violating time 
consistency as appealing. In that situation, the central bank would be under strong 
pressure to break the time-consistency principle. In the end, the central bank might 
fail to resist public pressure and might abandon its efforts to return the price level to 
the targeted level. 
2 The time-inconsistency problem is one of the basic theoretical issues which have been in the focus of 
the new monetary policy paradigm since the late 1970s and which have led to the crystallization of infla-
tion targeting as a “state-of-the-art” monetary policy regime. Inflation targeting, if conducted in a flexible 
manner, does not face this problem. In reaction to a positive cost-push shock, an inflation-targeting central 
bank allows inflation to rise temporarily above the target and tightens its policy only to the extent neces-
sary to get inflation back to the target in a reasonable time horizon. It is not obliged to offset the shift in 
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The proposal of Evans (2010) to use price-level targeting only in certain, pre-
cisely defined situations represents a  possible way out of the  time-inconsistency 
problem. One such situation is a liquidity trap accompanied by a double-digit unem-
ployment rate. Evans considers this a relatively rare event, with a frequency of twice 
a century or even lower. Temporary adoption of price-level targeting would enhance 
the credibility of the commitment to keep interest rates at zero for a sustained period 
and help the central bank to escape the liquidity trap. 
Another possibility to subdue the time-consistency dilemma would be to adopt 
pre-defined escape clauses (exemptions from the obligation to achieve the price tar-
get). Several inflation-targeting central banks, particularly those in small open econ-
omies and facing abundant external shocks, define and publicly announce a set of 
situations (usually supply-side shocks) where attempts to keep inflation on target 
would cause undesirable volatility of output and employment. In these situations 
the bank does not respond to the primary impacts of the shock and allows inflation to 
deviate from the  target. Similarly, a  central bank targeting the  price level might 
decide (and announce its decision) to ignore the price impacts of shocks that would 
require a strong monetary policy response with adverse effects on the real economy. 
However, in contrast to inflation targeting, this would require updating the target. 
The need to reset the target would inevitably reduce credibility in the regime. Thus, 
escape clauses might only reduce, not eliminate, the credibility loss stemming from 
the time-inconsistency problem in price-level targeting.  
The time-inconsistency problem under price-level targeting, or exchange rate 
targeting as an alternative way to escape the liquidity trap, is also acknowledged in 
Jeanne and Svensson (2007). They start from the assumption that besides its standard 
monetary policy objectives a central bank also considers the capital of the bank and 
tries to avoid a situation in which capital falls below a certain minimum level. Eco-
nomic agents know that the central bank will not accept future exchange rate appre-
ciation because that would have a negative impact on the capital due to revaluation of 
the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves. However, this line of reasoning falls 
short in light of the practical experience of central banks that have negative capital 
(including the Czech National Bank). These banks have not encountered any adverse 
effects of low or even negative capital on their decision-making or independence. 
3. Practical Experience with Price-Level Targeting 
3.1 Price-Level Targeting in Sweden 1931–1937 
Even though price-level targeting is given significant academic attention, prac-
tical experience with this regime is limited. In the existing literature, the Riksbank  
is considered to be the only central bank in the world to have applied the regime in 
practice (Berg and Jonung, 1998). 
Sveriges Riksbank adopted price-level targeting in 1931 after the  Swedish 
krona faced speculative attacks on its convertibility to gold. As soon as the krona quit 
the gold standard the Swedish government declared a commitment to stabilize prices 
“using all means available”. As a result of the economic crisis and price develop-
ments in Europe, consumer and producer prices in Sweden were declining from 1928 
onwards. Appreciation of the krona exchange rate after the gold standard was aban-
doned put Swedish prices under additional downside pressure. Therefore, the aim of Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1                                    13 
monetary policy was to bring an end to declining prices and to ensure price stability 
in the future. 
In the spring 1932, after eight months of work by several influential econo-
mists both from academia (Gustav Cassel, David Davidson, and Eli Heckscher) and 
from the Riksbank and after lively public discussion, the Swedish parliament adopt-
ed a monetary policy program for price stabilization. This program consisted of five 
major points: 
1.  The krona was to return to the gold standard or peg to the British pound in 
the future. For the time being, Sweden was to maintain a flexible exchange 
rate for the krona. Efforts to control the value of the krona were to start from 
the domestic price level and the needs of Sweden’s economy. 
2.  Continued deflation was to be resisted as strongly as inflation. 
3.  Some recovery in prices was desirable, though not a return to a “too distant” 
price level. Price increases due to custom duties were to be accepted. 
4.  Monetary policy was not to be tied schematically to a particular price index. 
5.  Interest rates were to be kept as low as conceivably possible without jeopard-
izing the monetary policy objective. 
In June 1933, the program was extended to include a sixth point giving 
the Riksbank a high degree of autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy, nowa-
days called instrumental independence. The Riksbank could choose the means of 
achieving the monetary policy objectives, but the objectives themselves were set by 
the parliament. 
The Riksbank tried to return to a fixed rate as early as November 1931 by peg-
ging the krona to the pound at the old gold parity rate. However, this attempt lasted 
for only three days. Between 1932 and 1933, the Riksbank accumulated foreign re-
serves and in July 1933 it established a successful peg of the krona to the British pound 
which lasted until the outbreak of WWII. This fixed exchange rate arrangement to 
the pound was viewed as being consistent with the program as long as prices in 
the United Kingdom moved in a moderate way consistent with the purpose of price 
stability. The only exception was the period 1936–1937, when British prices rose 
sharply. 
Price-level targeting was definitively abandoned in 1937, when the Riksbank’s 
mandate was extended to include stability of the economy and full capacity utilization. 
At the  same time, the  Riksbank’s independence was weakened as the  government 
pushed for stronger coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. 
Not many robust conclusions can be deduced from the experience of the Riksbank. 
Price-level targeting in its pure form existed for only a short period of time (until 
1933, when the exchange rate was fixed). Due to this short experience, the Riksbank’s 
credibility was not put to the test and the Riksbank did not face the problem of time 
inconsistency. Also, the Riksbank did not produce economic forecasts and it set in-
terest rates based on actual price developments (and later on the policy of the Bank  
of England). Cournède and Moccero (2009) find the Riksbank’s policy difficult to 
gauge due to a lack of any commitment to a specific policy horizon. Straumann and 
Woitek (2009) argue that the Riksbank was striving for a fixed exchange rate rather 
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to price-level targeting (and back) did not represent a significant change in monetary 
policy, as the gold standard was de facto price-level targeting determined by the price 
of a single commodity–gold. 
3.2 Deflationary Policy in Czechoslovakia 1919–1923 
Even though the Riksbank is mentioned as the first and until now the only 
central bank to have targeted the price level, the earlier experience of Czechoslovakia 
in the first years of its existence can be considered price-level targeting. Unlike in 
Sweden, where the regime was used to curb deflation, in Czechoslovakia it was intro-
duced for the opposite and more painful purpose, to produce deflation with the aim of 
bringing the price level back down to its pre-war level. This experience is described 
in the following paragraphs, drawing upon Rašín (1920), Rašín (1922), Jíša (1993), 
Matoušková (2008), and Vencovský (2003). 
The deflationary policy was the second stage of a currency reform realized 
between 1919 and 1923 by Alois Rašín, then Czechoslovak Minister of Finance. 
The purpose of this policy was to offset price increases from the previous war years. 
Similarly to Sweden later on, Czechoslovakia planned to re-introduce the gold stand-
ard. The last stage of the currency reform was to be stabilization of the price level 
and the koruna exchange rate at stronger levels.  
The first part of the  currency reform–restriction of currency in circulation 
(during which the volume of currency in circulation dropped by roughly one third)–
was carried out together with the currency separation of the Czechoslovak koruna 
from the Austrian krone. This restriction, however, did not prove to be very effective, 
as prices doubled in 1920 (see Figure 2). Although part of this increase in prices can 
be explained by an increase in indirect taxes and loose fiscal policy, it was obvious 
that reduction of the amount of money in circulation was not sufficient to achieve 
a lower price level. For that reason, in 1921 Rašín chose a different way–foreign ex-
change operations aimed at causing the koruna to appreciate, namely, foreign cur-
rency borrowing. 
The impacts of the deflationary policy on the real economy were rather severe. 
Industrial production dropped markedly in the period of 1921–1923. Similar develop-
ments in agricultural production were prevented only by the post-war shortage of 
basic food in a market that stimulated demand for production of these products de-
spite adverse price developments. Exports also slumped in this period. This was not 
surprising given the  intentional koruna appreciation amid marked depreciation of 
the  currencies of Czechoslovakia’s main trading partners (Germany and Austria) 
against the Swiss franc and the strong protectionism applied in most countries. 
Figure 3 depicts the koruna’s exchange rate against the Swiss franc together with 
the exchange rates of the German mark and Austrian krone (schilling).  
Despite this exchange rate appreciation, the balance of trade remained in sur-
plus as imports slumped due to protectionist measures applied by the Czechoslovak 
government. Whereas gross domestic product grew by 8% in 1921, in 1922 it drop-
ped by 3%. The falling economic performance raised unemployment, firms were 
caught in insolvency, and the banking sector, which had close relations with industry 
in the early years of the state, also encountered problems. However, the economy 
recovered surprisingly quickly and grew at a high pace (8% on average) in the rest of 
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Figure 2  Inflation and the Price Level in Czechoslovakia 1913–1929 
                        
Note: From 1913 to 1920 unweighted index of adminstrated prices of 38 items, between 1921–1923 prices  
of food, fuels, petrol and soap, from 1924 food prices.  
Sources: Ministry of Finance Report on Supplying People in Czechoslovakia, 1920; Statistical Handbook   
of Czechoslovakia, 1925; Price Reports of Statistical Office 1921–1929, Matoušková (2008). 
 
Figure 3  Exchange Rate of the Czechoslovak Koruna 1919–1923 
 
                                   
Source: Statistical Handbook of Czechoslovakia, 1925, Matoušková (2008) 
 
Figure 4  GDP in Czechoslovakia 1913–1929 
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The deflationary policy markedly worsened the economic position in the short 
run, but on the other hand it set up favorable conditions for the stabilization and long-
run growth of the Czechoslovak economy. Simultaneously, it made the new Czecho-
slovak koruna a credible currency. At that time, the koruna was a freely convertible 
currency and in 1929 it even returned to the gold standard and stayed there for 
the next five years. 
It is important to view Rašín’s reform with a historical perspective. After WWI  
it was necessary to improve the gloomy post-war state of the Czechoslovak economy 
and re-orient its directive management and its structure stemming from the  war 
period toward market principles. In doing that, it was necessary to establish an in-
dependent currency and rule out internal and external devaluation, as was observed, 
for example, in Germany. Despite its high openness, the post-war economy was self-
sufficient in production of basic needs such as food and coal. At the same time, 
the domestic economy, like the economies of neighboring countries, was affected by 
various protectionist measures. That explains why the link between the exchange rate 
and the prices of goods for daily use was not strong. The question also remains as to 
whether the koruna appreciation and subsequent fall in prices reflected the steadier 
economic and political situation in Czechoslovakia compared to neighboring coun-
tries rather than foreign exchange interventions. 
Similarly to Sweden, not many robust conclusions can be derived from 
the Czechoslovak experience. The reform was meant to be a temporary measure prior 
to a return to the gold standard. There was no independent central bank before 1926, 
monetary policy instruments were still developing, and the  economy had been   
badly damaged by the war and heavily affected by protectionist policy both in  
Czechoslovakia and in neighboring countries. Therefore, it is hard to assess the role 
of the reform in subsequent economic developments. However, the reform did 
achieve its main objectives – the price level decreased and the gold standard was re-
introduced.  
3.3 Price-Level Developments in Inflation-Targeting Countries 
Owing to the limited empirical experience it is worthwhile to analyze price-
level developments in inflation-targeting countries, especially the deviation of the actual 
price level from the hypothetical price-level path computed from inflation targets. 
This would test the hypothesis made by some economists, among them Fischer (1994), 
that the difference between inflation targeting and price-level targeting is not sub-
stantial in practice. 
Ruge-Murcia (2009) analyzes price-level developments in Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and covers the time period be- 
tween the introduction of inflation targeting in each country and September 2009.  
Ruge-Murcia found that in terms of actual price-level developments, inflation target-
ing was very similar to price-level targeting in Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom. On the contrary, in the cases of New Zealand and Sweden the price level 
moved away from the price-level path implied by the inflation targets (upwards in 
New Zealand, downwards in Sweden). 
In addition to graphical analysis, Ruge-Murcia ran unit root tests both on 
the  price level and on the  deviation of the  price level from its hypothetical path. 
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price-level targeting the existence of a unit root should be rejected. The results of 
the statistical tests confirmed the findings from the graphical analysis – inflation tar-
geting is highly similar to price-level targeting in the cases of Canada and the United 
Kingdom. However, no similarity was found for Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden. 
Ruge-Murcia presented a hypothesis that the similarity of inflation targeting to price-
level targeting in terms of the actual price-level developments observed in Canada 
and in the United Kingdom could have been a result of different conduct of inflation-
targeting policy in these countries. 
Ruge-Murcia’s results are quite surprising. The monetary policy regimes in 
Australia and New Zealand can be viewed as average-inflation targeting,
3 which is 
close to price-level targeting. Therefore, in contrast to Ruge-Murcia’s results, one 
would expect high similarity of inflation targeting with price-level targeting in these 
two countries.  
In the following paragraphs we build on the work of Ruge-Murcia, extending 
the analysis in two ways. First, we prolong the sample period to December 2010, 
which brings in more recent data affected by the financial crisis and the recent rise in 
commodity prices. Second, we also include the Czech Republic in the sample. Analo-
gously to Ruge-Murcia, we do both graphical analysis and unit root testing.  
Appendix 1 depicts the  inflation and price-level developments in Australia, 
Canada, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In-
flation is shown in comparison with the inflation target, and the price level in com-
parison with the hypothetical price-level path computed from the inflation target(s). 
The price level is set to 100 at the beginning of the sample (the introduction of infla-
tion targeting in the country concerned). The hypothetical price-level path is com-
puted from this initial price level assuming that the hypothetical target growth rate  
of the price level is equal to the inflation target (which can change over time, as in 
the cases of the Czech Republic, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). The fig-
ures in Appendix 1 take into account the  revisions of the  targets in the  Czech 
Republic, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 
The most recent inflation data are in most cases in line with the inflation tar-
get, with the exception of the United Kingdom, where inflation exceeds the target 
from December 2009 onwards. Also, inflation in the Czech Republic since the intro-
duction of inflation targeting in January 1998 has been mostly below the target(s). As 
a result, the price level has deviated significantly downwards from the hypothetical 
price-level target path, i.e., similarly as in Sweden (see above). If price-level target-
ing was conducted instead of inflation targeting, average inflation would have to be 
roughly double compared to actual inflation. 
The table in the Appendix 2 shows the unit root tests for all six countries in 
our sample. To make the results comparable, we conducted the tests with exactly 
the same settings as Ruge-Murcia. We test for unit roots both in the price level and in 
the deviation of the price level from its hypothetical target path. We use the Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test. The unit root tests 
for the price level take into account the intercept and the trend, whereas the tests for 
the  deviation from the  hypothetical price-level path are run without the  trend and 
3 Australia targets inflation of between 2 and 3 percent on average over the cycle, while New Zealand tar-
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with/without the intercept. The level of augmentation of the ADF test (that is, the num-
ber of lagged first differences in the OLS regression) was selected using recursive  
t-tests. The truncation lag of the PP test is set to three in all cases. Ruge-Murcia’s 
estimates are also provided in Appendix 2 for the sake of comparison. 
The results using the extended data set confirm Ruge-Murcia’s finding that 
in the cases of Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden the null hypothesis of a unit  
root cannot be rejected. However, the rejection of unit roots in the cases of Canada  
and the United Kingdom is not as unambiguous as in the shorter sample used by  
Ruge-Murcia. The results are strikingly different for the United Kingdom, where 
only one test out of the six is significant at the 10% significance level, whereas  
Ruge-Murcia found significance at the 5% level in four tests out of six. This shift in 
significance can be explained by inflation having been well above the target in 2010, 
as illustrated in Appendix 1.  
The results for the Czech Republic are also surprising, as the unit root tests 
with the intercept reject a unit root in the deviation of the price level from its hypo-
thetical path with 5% significance. This finding sharply contrasts with the figures in 
Appendix 1, where the actual price level lies far below the hypothetical path. How-
ever, it can also be seen from the figures that the deviation of the actual price level 
from its hypothetical path is steadily increasing in time. In the test, this deviation is 
absorbed by the intercept and the price level adjusted for this deviation reveals signs 
of stationarity. If the intercept is not included in the test, the unit root hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.  
Overall, we conclude that in the Czech Republic the actual price-level develop-
ments reject the similarity of inflation targeting with price-level targeting. The same re-
sults are obtained for Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden. In the case of the United 
Kingdom, the PP tests reveal some similarity of inflation targeting with price-level 
targeting, but these results are not very significant. Only in Canada do the actual 
price and inflation developments resemble the hypothetical outcomes under price-
level targeting. Given this observed similarity of inflation targeting with price-level 
targeting in Canada, it is not surprising that the Bank of Canada is considering 
switching to price-level targeting, possibly as early as 2012 (IMF, 2010).  
4. Conclusion 
Academic discussions on price-level targeting have revived recently as some 
central banks have reached the zero interest rate bound and been forced to use uncon-
ventional monetary policy tools. In this situation, voices calling for the temporary use 
of price-level targeting until the zero interest rate problem is resolved and the threat 
of deflation is over have gained in popularity. 
A substantial body of research exists on price-level targeting. The main con-
clusion of the theoretical research is that reducing uncertainty about the future price 
level leads to better-anchored price expectations. Firmly anchored expectations then 
improve the inflation and output variability trade-off and social welfare. However, 
this conclusion is sensitive to assumptions. If, for example, a large proportion of eco-
nomic agents are backward-looking, if the learning process for adapting a new regime 
lasts many years, or if there are significant real or nominal rigidities in the markets, 
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The benefits of price-level targeting are manifest in models which allow for 
a zero interest rate bound, as anchored price expectations make it possible to achieve 
negative real interest rates despite nominal interest rates being bound by zero. These 
models also conclude that reaching the zero interest rate bound is less likely under 
price-level targeting. 
Despite the efforts of academia to make the models of price-level targeting 
more realistic (e.g. by introducing micro-foundations, heterogeneous markets or 
a  learning process), the  models still hinge on questionable assumptions (e.g. i.i.d. 
supply shocks and a fully functional transmission mechanism) and therefore offer too 
simple a representation of a real economy. Thus, the question of whether it is pos-
sible, in practice, to exploit the theoretical benefits of price-level targeting remains 
unanswered. 
The obvious disadvantage of price-level targeting is more complicated com-
munication of monetary policy, either of the target or of day-to-day central bank de-
cision making. It would be difficult to explain, for example, the intention to achieve 
low or even negative inflation in reaction to an inflationary shock. In this situation, 
the central bank encounters time-inconsistency problems, and, besides dealing with 
communication problems, it might be exposed to political pressures to opportunis-
tically quit price-level targeting. 
The experience of Sweden, whose monetary policy during the 1930s is often 
labeled as price-level targeting, does not bring much knowledge due to the  short 
duration and rather vague settings of the  regime. The  experience of deflationary 
policy in Czechoslovakia in the first years after WWI, which could also be consid-
ered price-level targeting, is not very valuable for today’s monetary policy considera-
tions either. 
Currently, no central bank is using price-level targeting. The Bank of Canada 
is considering introducing this regime. In the case of Canada, a switch to price-level 
targeting would not necessarily mean a big change, since the actual results of infla-
tion targeting there do not significantly differ from price-level targeting in terms  
of price-level developments. In other inflation-targeting countries, switching from 
inflation targeting to price-level targeting would represent a considerable change 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 62, 2012, no. 1                                        23 
APPENDIX 2 
 
Unit Root Tests of the Price Level and the Deviation of The Price Level 
from Its Hypothetical Target Path – Selected Inflation-Targeting Countries 
 
Log of the Price Level Deviation from Hypothetical Path 
   With  Intercept  No  Intercept 
   
 Time Span 
ADF PP ADF  PP  ADF  PP 
Australia  1993:Q1–2010:Q4  -2.076  -2.091 -1.237 -1.196 -1.109 -1.077 
Canada 1996:M1–2010:M12  -3.163*  -2.956  -2.988** -2.796* -2.988** -2.804*** 
New  
Zealand  1991:Q1–2010:Q4  -0.916  -1.078  - - - - 
Sweden 1995:M1–2010:M12  -1.800  -2.169  -2.225  -1.630  -  - 
UK 1992:M10–2010:M12  -2.930  -3.274*  -0.804 -1.338 -0.289 -0.892 
Czech  
Republic  1998:M1–2010:M12 -2.583  -2.301 -3.418** -3.185** - - 
Ruge-Murcia (2009) estimates         
Log of the Price Level Deviation from Hypothetical Path 
   With  Intercept  No  Intercept 
   
 Time Span 
ADF PP ADF  PP  ADF  PP 
Australia  1993:Q1–2009:Q3  -1.956  -1.970 -1.214 -1.208 -1.158 -1.161 
Canada 1996:M1–2009:M9  -3.531** -3.175* -2.984** -2.714* -2.991** -2.719** 
New 
Zealand  1991:Q1–2009:Q3 -1.109  -1.091  -0.198  -0.006 -  - 
Sweden 1995:M1–2009:M9  -1.841  -2.173  -2.006  -1.386  -  - 
UK 1992:M10–2009:M9  -3.479** -3.718** -2.353  -2.940** -1.472  -2.513** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, positive test values are not reported in the table. 
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